# Table of Contents

**Preface**  
5

**Table of Cases**  
11

**Table of Figures and Tables**  
25

**Introduction**  
27  
A. Purpose of the Book  
27  
B. Antitrust Law  
28  
C. Private Antitrust Litigation  
29  
D. Empirical Data  
30  
E. Plan of the Book  
31

**Part I. Private Antitrust Litigation in Japan**  
33

*Chapter 1. Historical Background*  
35  
A. Drafting History: Private Enforcement’s Hostile Reception  
35  
B. The Provisions on Private Damages: Japanese or American?  
40  
C. Exploring the Reasons for Japan’s Skepticism Towards Private Enforcement  
41

*Chapter 2. Damages Actions*  
49  
A. Legal Basis  
49  
B. No Treble or Punitive Damages  
60  
C. Standing for Indirect Purchasers and Passing-on  
61  
D. No Opt-out Class Action Mechanism  
62  
E. Limited Discovery and Fact Pleading  
65  
F. Limited Use of Contingency Fees  
67  
G. Recovery of Court Costs and Attorney Fees  
69  
H. Funding Mechanisms Other than Contingency Fees  
70  
I. Calculation of Damages and Interest  
71  
J. The Evidentiary Value of a Prior JFTC Order or Decision  
71  
K. The Role of the JFTC in Damages Actions  
73  
L. Access to the JFTC’s File  
74  
M. The Absence of a Developed Plaintiffs’ Bar  
79

*Chapter 3. Injunctions*  
81  
A. Situation Prior to 2000  
81  
B. Introduction of the Injunction System in 2000  
85  
C. Main Features of the Injunction System  
86  
D. Broader Discovery Rules (Amendment of 2009)  
88

*Chapter 4. Residents’ Lawsuits on the Basis of the Local Autonomy Act*  
91  
A. Residents’ Lawsuits and the Local Autonomy Act  
91  
B. How Residents’ Suits Became a Tool to Enforce Antitrust Law  
94  
C. How Residents’ Lawsuits Function  
96

Maklu  
7
### Chapter 5. Other Forms of Private Antitrust Litigation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A. Voidness</td>
<td>117</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. Actions Based on Unjust Enrichment</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. Antitrust Law as a Defense to the Enforcement of Arbitral Awards</td>
<td>121</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D. Derivative Actions</td>
<td>123</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E. The Role of Private Parties in Public Enforcement</td>
<td>126</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Chapter 6. Empirical Analysis of Japanese Antitrust Cases

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A. Scope of the Empirical Study and Methodology</td>
<td>128</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. The Number of Cases in the Postwar Era</td>
<td>130</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. A Closer Look at the Numbers in the Last Two Decades</td>
<td>132</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D. The Types of Antitrust Violations</td>
<td>134</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E. Success Rate</td>
<td>136</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F. Do Private Litigants Detect New Violations?</td>
<td>136</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G. How Much Have Infringers Paid?</td>
<td>137</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H. Who Has Recovered Damages?</td>
<td>140</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I. Conclusions from the Empirical Analysis</td>
<td>142</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Part II. Private Antitrust Litigation in the European Union

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter 7. Historical Background</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A. Early Attitudes</td>
<td>151</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. The Start of Antitrust Law in the European Union: Enforcement</td>
<td>153</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Centralized with the European Commission</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. The European Court of Justice as Catalyst of Private Enforcement</td>
<td>154</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D. The Decentralization of Antitrust Law Enforcement</td>
<td>155</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E. Exploring the Reasons for Europe’s Skepticism Towards Private</td>
<td>158</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enforcement and the Recent Change</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter 8. Damages Actions</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A. Legal Basis and Conflict-of-Laws</td>
<td>161</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. No or Limited Punitive Damages</td>
<td>172</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. Standing for Indirect Purchasers and Passing-on</td>
<td>174</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D. Almost No Opt-Out Class Action Mechanisms</td>
<td>177</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E. Limited Discovery</td>
<td>181</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F. Limited Use of Contingency Fees</td>
<td>182</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G. Recovery of Court Costs and Attorney Fees</td>
<td>183</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H. Funding Mechanisms Other than Contingency Fees</td>
<td>185</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I. Calculation of Damages and Interest</td>
<td>186</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J. Evidentiary Value of Decisions by the Competition Authorities</td>
<td>187</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>K. The Role of the Competition Authorities</td>
<td>189</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L. Access to the File of the Competition Authorities</td>
<td>191</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M. The Development of a Plaintiffs’ Bar</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Chapter 9. Injunctions
   A. Legal Basis: National Law but Constrained by EU Law
   B. Types of Injunctive Relief
   C. Role of Injunctive Relief
   D. Types of Antitrust Violations for Which Injunctive Relief Is Available
   E. Requirements to Obtain Injunctive Relief

Chapter 10. Other Forms of Private Antitrust Litigation
   A. Nullity
   B. Actions Based on Unjust Enrichment
   C. Antitrust Law as a Defense to the Enforcement of Arbitral Awards
   D. Derivative Actions and Other Forms of Litigation
   E. The Role of Private Parties in Public Enforcement

Chapter 11. Empirical Analysis of Cases in the EU
   A. Sources
   B. The Number of Cases
   C. The Types of Antitrust Violations
   D. Success Rate
   E. Do Private Litigants Detect New Violations?
   F. How Much Have Infringers Paid?
   G. Who Has Recovered Damages?
   H. Conclusion and Comparison

Part III. The Future of Private Antitrust Litigation in Japan and the EU
   Chapter 12. The Debate About Whether Private Antitrust Litigation Should Be Facilitated
       A. Clarifying the Goals of Private Antitrust Litigation
       B. The Need to Ensure Compensation
       C. The Need for Additional Deterrence
       D. Determining Whether Additional Deterrence Should Come from Private or Public Enforcement
       E. Conclusion

   Chapter 13. Moving Forward: Lessons from the Comparative Analysis
       A. Collective Actions by Indirect Purchasers
       B. The Potential Contribution of Injunctive Relief
       C. The Problems with Special Regimes for Follow-on Actions
       D. The Lessons from the Residents’ Lawsuits Movement in Japan

Appendix. The Oil Cartel Cases: Summary and Translation

Bibliography